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THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM?
PIERCE COUNTY V GUILLEN AS A CASE STUDY
LYNN A. BAKER*
INTRODUCTION
The most interesting aspect of current federalism doctrine, I
believe, is the role of the spending power, particularly conditional
federal spending. In this brief essay, I will discuss that larger issue
by focusing primarily on a 2003 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion, Pierce County v. Guillen,1 that likely went unnoticed even by
most federalism junkies.
Guillen came to the Court after the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton held that the federal statute at issue exceeded Congress's
spending power 2 under the doctrine set forth in South Dakota v.
Dole.3 Rather than seize this extraordinarily rare opportunity to re-
* Frederick M. Baron Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. This
Essay is an edited version of remarks presented at the panel "From Warren to Rehnquist
and Beyond: Federalism as Theory, Doctrine, Practice, and Instrument," sponsored by
the Section on Federal Courts at the AALS Annual Meeting in San Francisco, Califor-
nia, on January 7, 2005. 1 am grateful to Ed Purcell and Louise Weinberg for inviting
me to participate, to Mitch Berman and Larry Sager for insightful conversations about
many of the issues discussed in this Essay, and to Erin Smith and Louise Weinberg for
useful comments on an early draft.
Some of the issues raised in this Essay are discussed at greater length in Lynn A.
Baker, Federalism and the Spending Power from Dole to Birmingham Board of Education, in
THE REHNQULsT LEGACY 205 (C. Bradley ed., 2006) [hereinafter Baker, Federalism and
the Spending Power], and in Lynn A. Baker, Lochner's Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce
County v. Guillen as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REv. 725 (2005) (proceedings of confer-
ence on "Lochnds Centennial").
1. 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
2. Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 650-52 (Wash. 2001) rev'd, 537 U.S. 129
(2003). Congress's spending power derives from Article I, § 8 of the Constitution,
which empowers Congress to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3. 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). The Court stated the doctrinal test as follows:
The spending power is of course not unlimited, Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, and n.13 .... (1981), but is instead
subject to several general restrictions articulated in our cases. The first of
these limitations is derived from the language of the Constitution itself: the
exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of "the general welfare."
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consider the Court's spending clause doctrine in light of its larger,
evolving federalism jurisprudence, however, even the "States'
Rights Five"4 chose simply to avoid the spending power issue. The
Court instead resolved Guillen on cursory and highly suspect Com-
merce Clause grounds.5
In this essay, I ask "Why?" and tentatively suggest an answer.
My thesis is that Guillen can be reconciled with the positions taken
by the States' Rights Five in other recent spending and commerce
power cases if one acknowledges the possibility that those justices
have engaged throughout in an incompletely theorized and largely
unarticulated inquiry into whether the regulatory area at issue is
See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-641 .... (1937); United States v.
Butler, [297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)]. In considering whether a particular expen-
diture is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer
substantially to the judgment of Congress. Helvering v. Davis, [301 U.S.] at
640, 645 .... Second, we have required that if Congress desires to condi-
tion the States' receipt of federal funds, it "must do so unambiguously ....
enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation." Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,
[451 U.S.] at 17 .... Third, our cases have suggested (without significant
elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they
are unrelated "to the federal interest in particular national projects or pro-
grams." Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 ... (1978) (plurality
opinion). See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, [357 U.S. 275, 295
(1958)]. ("[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasona-
ble conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all
objectives thereof'). Finally, we have noted that other constitutional provi-
sions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal
funds. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70
... (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 ... (1976) (per curiam); Kingv.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, n. 34... (1968).
Id. at 207-08. In addition to these four restrictions, the Dole Court read the Spending
Clause to impose limits on Congress's ability to "coerce" the states in ways that it could
not directly mandate under its other Article I powers. "[I] n some circumstances," the
Court observed, "the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as
to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' Id. at 211 (quoting Stew-
ard Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
For further discussion of the origins and operation of the Dole doctrine, see Baker,
Federalism and the Spending Power, supra note *.
4. The five are the late ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas who together provided the majority for the Court's major federal-
ism decisions beginning with New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See, e.g.,
Editorial, Fiddling with Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at A34 (referring to these
justices as the "states' rights five").
5. Guillen, 537 U.S at 146-48 (2003).
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one in which the states "historically have been sovereign" 6 or is an
area of traditional and appropriate federal concern. That is, per-
haps Guillen is part of a larger, quiet revival of the doctrine set forth
by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1976 in National League of Cit-
ies v. Usey 7 and that the Court, over his dissent, declared "unsound
in principle and unworkable in practice" in 1985 in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.8
6. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849 (1976) (inquiring whether the congressional enact-
ment would "interfere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty").
7. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In National League of Cities, then-Justice Rehnquist,
joined by then-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stewart, held
that:
This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of
Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise
plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are conferred by Art.
I of the Constitution....
[Tihe dispositive factor [here] is that Congress has attempted to
exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages and
maximum hours to be paid by the States in their capacities as sovereign
governments. In so doing, Congress has sought to wield its power in a fash-
ion that would impair the States' "ability to function effectively in a federal
system".... This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with
the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution. We hold
that insofar as the challenged amendment operates to directly displace the
States 'freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8,
cl. 3.
Id. at 842, 852 (emphasis added). Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White
dissented.
8. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, Justice Blackmun, joined by justices Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, and White, explicitly overruled National League of Cities, id. at 557,
holding
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope
of the governmental functions deemed protected under National League of
Cities ....
The distinction [between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions]
the Court discarded as unworkable in the field of tax immunity has proved
no more fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under the Commerce
Clause. Neither do any of the alternative standards that might be employed
to distinguish between protected and unprotected governmental functions
appear manageable ....
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a
2005-20061
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I. GUILLEN IN THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT
Guillen involved various constitutional challenges to a federal
statute that, in relevant part, regulates the rules of evidence to be
applied in state court proceedings involving causes of action
brought solely under state law.9 These regulations - which protect
from discovery and introduction into evidence certain accident re-
ports and highway safety data compiled and held by city and county
governments - are included among the conditions that attach to
the states' receipt of certain federal highway safety monies. 10
The statute became the focus of litigation when the families of
two Washington State motorists involved in traffic accidents re-
quested accident reports and other materials and data held by
county agencies related to the traffic history of their accident
sites.' The family members sought the information in part to pur-
sue tort claims that the relevant city and county governments negli-
gently maintained and operated the intersections at which the
accidents occurred.12 Pierce County refused to provide the re-
quested information, invoking the federal statute that it contended
rendered the information privileged even for purposes of a state
court proceeding.13
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is "inte-
gral" or "traditional."
Id. at 539, 543, 546-47. Then-Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Powell, and
Rehnquist dissented.
9. Guillen, 31 P.3d 628 (Wash. 2001).
10. See Guilen, 537 U.S. at 133-36.
11. Id. at 136-38; see also Guillen, 31 P.3d at 633-37.
12. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 137; see also Guillen, 31 P.3d at 634-35.
13. In refusing to provide the requested reports and data, Pierce County relied on
23 U.S.C. § 409, as amended in 1995, which states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, schedules,
lists, or data compiled or collected for the purpose of identifying, evaluat-
ing, or planning the safety enhancement of potential accident sites ....
pursuant to section[ I . .. 152 of this title or for the purpose of developing
any highway safety construction improvement project which may be imple-
mented utilizing Federal-aid highway funds shall not be subject to discovery
or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding or consid-
ered for other purposes in any action for damages arising from any occur-
rence at a location mentioned or addressed in such reports, surveys,
schedules, lists, or data.
Because the accident reports and other materials that the plaintiffs sought had been
collected by the relevant county as part of an application to the state of Washington for
[Vol. 50
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The Washington Supreme Court ultimately held that the fed-
eral statute exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause and the Spending Clause. 14 Thus, Guillen became the first
case in which any court had struck down a federal statute as exceed-
ing Congress's spending power under the doctrine set forth in 1987
in South Dakota v. Dole.15
II. GUILLEN IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
For those interested in federalism, the decision of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in Guillen was positively brimming with pos-
sibilities. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, it is the spending
power that I believe poses the most significant threat to state auton-
omy.16 No matter how narrowly the Court might read Congress's
federal hazard elimination funds under § 152, the county argued that they were privi-
leged under § 409. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 634.
14. The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that § 409 was not a valid exercise
of Congress's commerce power because such an expansive privilege "cannot reasonably
be characterized as an 'integral part' of the Federal-aid highway system's regulation."
Guillen, 31 P.3d at 654 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 328 n.17 (1981)). The
court also concluded that the privilege did not meet Dole's requirement that any condi-
tion attached to the receipt of federal funds be related to the spending program:
We find that no valid federal interest in the operation of the federal safety
enhancement program is reasonably served by barring the admissibility and
discovery in state court of accident reports and other traffic and accident
materials and "raw data" that were originally prepared for routine state and
local purposes, simply because they are "collected," ... among other reasons,
pursuant to a federal statute for federal purposes.
Id. at 651 (emphasis in original). The court therefore held § 409, as amended, to have
exceeded Congress's spending power.
Lastly, relying heavily on its construal of recent Rehnquist Court federalism deci-
sions as displaying a "fundamental respect for state sovereignty," id. at 653, the court
reasoned that § 409 "cannot be characterized as a valid exercise of any power constitu-
tionally delegated to the federal government." Id. at 655. Simply stated, Congress lacks
"power to intrude upon the exercise of state sovereignty in so fundamental an area of
the law as the determination by state and local courts of the discoverability and admissi-
bility of state and local materials and data relating to traffic and accidents on state and
local roads .... " Id.
15. See Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). See also supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 1911, 1920 (1995) ("[I]f the Spending Clause is simultaneously interpreted to per-
mit Congress to seek otherwise forbidden regulatory aims indirectly through a condi-
tional offer of federal funds to the states, the notion of 'a federal government of
enumerated powers' will have no meaning." (footnote omitted)); Lynn A. Baker &
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doc-
trine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003);
2005-2006]
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powers under the Commerce Clause 17 and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 8 and no matter how absolute a prohibition the Court
might impose on Congress's "commandeering" of state and local
officials, 19 the states will be at the mercy of Congress so long as
there are no meaningful limits on its spending power.20
Thus, Guillen seemed to offer the Supreme Court - or at least
the States' Rights Five - an opportunity that they will not likely
soon again have to affirm that the doctrine set forth in Dole does in
fact have "bite," and that the spending power does not provide Con-
gress an eternally available means of circumventing those limita-
tions on Congress's other Article I powers that the Court has
recognized.
For me, the case was every law professor's dream: an issue that
I had been thinking and writing about for nearly a decade had
made its way to the Court. My colleague, Mitch Berman, and I sub-
mitted an amicus brief in the case. 2' We focused our attention on
the spending power issue and argued - utterly persuasively, we
thought - that the statute violated at least two of the requirements
set out in Dole the "clear notice" (or so-called Pennhurst prong) 22
Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Clause and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 195, 195-96
(2001) (contribution to symposium on "The Spending Clause").
17. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
18. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000);
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
19. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
20. Today, the major constitutional constraint on Congress's spending power is
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
105 (1968) (holding that "the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does spe-
cifically limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8").
21. See Brief for Lynn A. Baker and Mitchell N. Berman as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Rcspondents, Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (No. 01-1229), 2002
WL 1964091 [hereinafter Brie]. Professor Berman and I received no monetary contri-
bution to, or financial compensation for, the preparation and submission of our brief.
22. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (" [W] e have required that if Congress desires to con-
dition the States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously. . . , enabl [ing]
the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.'") (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)); Brief, supra note 21, at *8-*15.
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and the "relatedness" requirement. 23
The first of these seemed like a slam dunk: the sixteen courts
that had discussed the statute had been divided in their interpreta-
tions of the statute's meaning, so it seemed clear that the states
could not know with certainty the terms of the funding "contract"
with the federal government.24 And insofar as the explicit federal
23. Id. at 207-08 ("[O]ur cases have suggested (without significant elaboration)
that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs."') (citing Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)); Brief supra note 21, at *15-*22.
24. The text of 23 U.S.C. § 409 contains at least four significant ambiguities of the
sort that surely would have precluded States and their political subdivisions from know-
ing with any certainty the terms of their "contract" with the federal government. See
Brief supra note 21, at *8-* 15. The most noteworthy of these ambiguities is the one that
divided the Washington Supreme Court: can a local government shield from discovery
and introduction into evidence all pre-existing, highway-related reports and data simply
by collecting them for the purposes specified in § 409? A majority of the Washington
Court held that the collecting of certain reports and data for the statutorily specified
purpose rendered them privileged even if they had been compiled for other purposes,
such as routine law enforcement. Gui len, 31 P.3d at 640-46. Three of the Washington
justices, however, disagreed with this interpretation of § 409, and would not have ex-
tended the privilege so far. Id. at 656-59 (Madsen, J., concurring).
The justices of the Washington Supreme Court were not alone in finding the text
of § 409 ambiguous in this regard. The fifteen additional courts that that have dis-
cussed this aspect of § 409 have been divided in their interpretations, with ten courts
reading this aspect of § 409 broadly as the Guillen majority did. See Powers v. CSX
Transp., 177 F. Supp.2d 1276, 1280 (S.D. Ala. 2001); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Transwood, Inc., 2001 WL 986868 *1, *2 (E.D. La. 2001); Isbell v. Arizona, 9 P.3d 322,
324 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc); Palacios v. La. & Delta R.R., Inc., 740 So.2d 95, 101-02 (La.
1999); Reichert v. Louisiana, 694 So.2d 193, 200 (La. 1997); Dowell v. Louisiana, 750
So.2d 498, 501 (La. App. 2000); Sevario v. Louisiana, 752 So.2d 221, 230 (La. App.
1999); Fry v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 715 So.2d 632, 637 (La. App. 1998); Harden-
stein v. Cook Constr., 691 So.2d 177, 182 (La. App. 1997); Coniker v. New York, 695
N.Y.S.2d 492, 495, 496 (N.Y. Ct. Claims 1999). Five courts read the text more narrowly,
essentially as the Guillen concurrence did. See Werner v. IA Constr. Corp., 51 Pa. D. &
C. 4th 509, 513 (2001); Ex parte Ala. Dep't of Trans., 757 So.2d 371, 374 (Ala. 1999);
Irion v. Louisiana, 760 So.2d 1220, 1226 (La. App. 2000); Guillen v. Pierce County, 982
P.2d 123, 129 (Wash. App. 1999); Palacios v. La. & Delta R.R., Inc., 682 So.2d 806, 810
(La. App. 1997). In the words of one federal district court, "Section 409 has engen-
dered some confusion in the courts, thanks to its unwieldy language and the absence of
any significant legislative history." Powers, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
The extent of the ambiguity in § 409 is further underscored by the fact that the
U.S. Supreme Court found it necessary to "determine the statute's proper scope"
before it could address the constitutional questions raised. Guilen, 537 U.S. at 143.
Indeed, as the Court noted, the Petitioner, Respondents, and the United States as inter-
venor each proposed a different interpretation of § 409 in their briefs, with the Court
ultimately adopting the Government's interpretation of the statute. Id. at 143-46.
2005-2006]
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interest to be served by the funding program was increasing high-
way safety, 25 the broad evidentiary privilege mandated by the fund-
ing condition seemed clearly to reduce one of the incentives that
encourage state and local governments to improve the safety of
their highways: the threat of tort liability. One cannot successfully
sue a county for negligent maintenance of its highways if a federal
statute makes it impossible to obtain or introduce into evidence the
accident reports and other data necessary to establish such a claim.
And such a reduction in the county's threat of tort liability would
seem logically to result in reduced, rather than increased, highway
safety, an outcome obviously antithetical to the federal funding pro-
gram's claimed interest in increasing highway safety.
The Commerce Clause issue seemed even more clear to Mitch
and myself. As we elaborated in our amicus brief, the statute at
issue regulated apparently non-commercial activity - the discovery
and introduction of evidence in civil litigation 26 - and interfered
with state judicial processes, which are a traditional core area of
state sovereignty.27 We expected at least five Justices to easily find
In many contexts, the Court has the option - indeed the self-imposed obligation
- to construe an ambiguous statute to avoid a "constitutionally doubtful" construction
where possible. See, e.g.,Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 851, 857 (2000); EdwardJ.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Del & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909). Under the Court's spending power doctrine as set forth in Dole, however, the
mere existence of the ambiguity is constitutionally determinative - and fatal. This is
not only because such legislation is "in the nature of a contract," Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999); see also id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing), but also because "the clear-notice safeguard of our Spending Clause jurispru-
dence" is a "vital safeguard for the federal balance." Id. AsJustice Kennedy wrote in his
dissent in Davis, "Only if states receive clear notice of the conditions attached to federal
funds can they guard against excessive federal intrusion into state affairs and be vigilant
in policing the boundaries of federal power." Id.
25. Section 409 is a subsection of Chapter 4 of Title XXIII, which is titled "High-
way Safety," and Chapter 4 originated as the Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966). "Section 409 forms part of a comprehensive federal plan to
promote highway... safety." Dowell, 750 So.2d at 500; see also Brief supra note 21, at * i7.
26. See Brief supra note 21, at *22-*24.
27. See id. at *24-*25, stating:
This Court has clearly held that Congress may regulate state court proce-
dure with regard to federal causes of action brought in state court, see, e.g.,
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952);
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). This Court has also repeatedly
observed, however, that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so
[Vol. 50
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the statute unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez2 8 and United
States v. Morrison.29
In fact, the entire Court did find the case easy, but not in the
way we had hoped. In a brief, fifteen-page opinion, released ten
short weeks after oral argument in the case,30 the Court unani-
mously concluded that the statute at issue was a valid exercise of
Congress's commerce power. 31 The Court therefore never reached
the spending power issue.
The Commerce Clause analysis in Justice Thomas's opinion
comprises a mere seven sentences and proceeds as a straightfor-
ward syllogism.3 2 First, quoting Lopez, "under the Commerce
Clause, Congress 'is empowered to regulate and protect the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, .. . even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities.'" 3 3 Second, the statute at issue
"can be viewed as legislation aimed at improving safety in the chan-
nels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentali-
as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States.
Among other things, it is normally "within the power of the State to regu-
late procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden
of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion." Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977), quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
523 (1958). See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (a
state "is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its
own conception of policy and fairness, unless in so doing it offends some
principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental"), Felder, 487 U.S. at 138 ("No one disputes
the general and unassailable proposition . . . that States may establish the
rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts."). Further, this
Court in Lopez cautioned that it is particularly important for limitations on
federal power to be maintained "in areas ... where States historically have
been sovereign," 514 U.S. at 564.
28. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
29. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
30. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 129. The case was argued on November 4, 2002, and
decided on January 14, 2003.
31. Id. at 146-48.
32. Id. at 146-47.
33. Id. at 147 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (1995) (citing Shreveport Rate Cases,
234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971))).
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ties of interstate commerce. '3 4 Therefore, the legislation "fall[s]
within Congress's Commerce Clause power."35
This is a highly questionable and conclusory Commerce Clause
analysis, made further remarkable by its failure to acknowledge at
any point that the statute at issue in fact regulates the rules of evi-
dence to be employed in state court proceedings. From the Court's
opinion, one might have imagined that the statute instead regu-
lated highways.
III. SOLVING THE PUZZLE Or GUILLEN
Why were all nine justices willing to resolve Guillen through a
highly dubious Commerce Clause analysis that is seemingly incon-
sistent with the Court's own precedent?3 6 Why did the States'
Rights Five forego this rare opportunity to strengthen or re-affirm
the significance of existing spending power doctrine which is so
central to any meaningful "federalist revival"?
There are not many data points to connect, but I believe that
the decision in Guillen can be reconciled with Lopez3 7 and Morri-
son, 3 8 as well as with both the majority and dissenting opinions in
the two cases to date in which any member of the Court has held
that a federal statute exceeded Congress's spending power: South
Dakota v. Dole 9 and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.40 My
quite preliminary thesis is that the fundamental focus of the States'
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. For a thoughtful discussion of this question that proposes a different answer
than that put forward here, see Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the
Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IowA L. REv. 1487, 1533 (2004) (concluding that
"Guillen issued not from attention to the Court's own Commerce Clause doctrine but
rather from sensitivity to the Court's understanding of Commerce Clause meaning").
37. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
38. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
39. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
40. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). Several months after i presented these remarks in San
Francisco, the Court decided Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167
(2005). Justice Thomas, writing in dissent and joined by the late Chief Justice Rehn-
quist andJustices Kennedy and Scalia, contended that the implied right of action under
Title IX for retaliation claims at issue in the case would violate Dole's clear notice re-
quirement. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1514-15. For a discussion of how that most recent
case is also consistent with the tentative thesis set forth in this essay, see Baker, Federalism
and the Spending Power, supra note *, at 219.
[Vol. 50
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Rights Five in both the spending power and Commerce Clause
cases is on whether the regulated area at issue is one in which the
States "historically have been sovereign" 41 or is instead a traditional
and appropriate federal function.
By the time the Court decided Guillen, each member of the
States' Rights Five was on record as having been willing to invalidate
a federal statute under the doctrine set out in Dole. In 1987, Justice
O'Connor made clear in her dissent in Dole that she would have
invalidated the statute at issue under the prong of the Dole test that
requires conditions on federal grants to be "reasonably related to
the purpose of the federal program."42 Twelve years later in Davis,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas
in dissent, all would have invalidated the challenged statute under
the so-called Pennhurst, or "unambiguousness," prong of the Dole
doctrine. 43
It therefore seems implausible that any of the States' Rights
Five was aggressively avoiding reaching the spending power issue in
Guillen. It seems more likely, notwithstanding my own contrary
analysis under the spending power, that each of these Justices in
fact believed that the statute at issue in Guillen should be sustained
under Dole. There was therefore no pressing need for them to
reach the spending power issue in that case.
Why is it plausible that none of the States' Rights Five would
have applied the Dole doctrine in Guillen so strictly as I applied it?
My larger thesis is that the Five would in fact, if implicitly, have
focused in their decisionmaking on whether the core regulatory ac-
tivity at issue was a "traditional" and appropriate area of federal
rather than state regulatory concern. 44
41. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Davis, 526 U.S. 629, 654 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). See also National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849 (discussing whether the congres-
sional enactment would "interfere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty").
42. Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor contended that
"the Court's application of the requirement that the condition imposed be reasonably
related to the purpose for which the funds are expended is cursory and unconvinc-
ing.... In my view, establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently
related to interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated
for that purpose." Id. at 213-14.
43. See 526 U.S. at 654-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
44. The "relatedness" prong of the Dole doctrine, 483 U.S. at 207, is a potential
toe-hold for this inquiry, and was the centerpiece ofJustice O'Connor's dissent in Dole.
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To see how this (under-theorized and incompletely articu-
lated) inquiry may have been deployed by the Court in the past,
consider the majority and dissenting opinions in Davis.45 The ques-
tion presented was whether a private damages action may lie against
a school board under Title IX in cases of student-on-student harass-
ment.46 This majority opinion, authored by justice O'Connor, por-
trays the case as being about certain anti-discrimination regulations
contained in Title IX. 47 And such regulations, at least since the
Civil War, generally have been considered an appropriate area of
federal concern. 48 O'Connor's view, consistent with my thesis, was
that the challenged condition on federal funds passed muster
under Dole.49
In a dissent authored by Justice Kennedy, the remaining four
of the States' Rights Five would have held the challenged provision
invalid.50 Although their explicit contention was that the chal-
lenged condition on federal funds did not survive scrutiny under
the "clear-notice" prong of the Dole test,51 the core of these Justices'
See id. at 213; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text. It does not, however, seem
to play that role in Davis, 526 U.S. 629, or Jackson, 544 U.S. 167. That prong requires an
examination of whether there is a "federal interest" in the relevant project or program,
and then a determination of whether the challenged condition on the federal grant of
funds is "unrelated" to that "federal interest." Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. A regulatory
area that has traditionally been the province of the states would presumably have diffi-
culty passing this "federal interest" test, no matter what the challenged condition on
federal funds.
45. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629; id. at 654 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 632-33.
47. Id. at 639 ("[A] t issue here is the question whether a recipient of federal edu-
cation funding may be liable for damages under Title IX under any circumstances for
discrimination in the form of student-on-student sexual harassment.") (emphasis added);
id at 650-51 ("We have elsewhere concluded that sexual harassment is a form of discrim-
ination for Title IX purposes .... ") (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1868, pro-
hibits "any State" from denying "the equal protection of the laws" to "any person within
its jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. 526 U.S. at 649-50 ("Title IX proscribes harassment with sufficient clarity to
satisfy Pennhurst's notice requirement and serve as a basis for a damages action.").
50. Id. at 654-58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 654-58. See especially id. at 657:
In order to make its case for school liability for peer sexual harassment, the
majority must establish that Congress gave grant recipients clear and unam-
biguous notice that they would be liable in money damages for failure to
remedy discriminatory acts of their students. The majority must also
demonstrate that the statute gives schools clear notice that one child's har-
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concern was that the statute, ultimately, was about the federal regu-
lation of local schools. Consider the following excerpt from that
dissent:
The Nation's schoolchildren will learn their first lessons
about federalism in classrooms where the Federal Govern-
ment is the ever-present regulator. The Federal Govern-
ment will have insinuated itself not only into one of the
most traditional areas of state concern but also into one
of the most sensitive areas of human affairs. This federal
control of the discipline of our Nation's schoolchildren is
contrary to our traditions and inconsistent with the sensi-
ble administration of our schools .... 52
Thus, from O'Connor's perspective, Davis was "about" an area
of traditional federal concern - the regulation of civil rights via a
prohibition on gender-based discrimination - while from the per-
spective of Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas the case was
"about" a regulatory area - public schools - that has historically
been the province of the states. Consistent with my thesis,
O'Connor found no congressional overreaching; the dissenters
concluded that Congress had exceeded its spending power.
Now consider Guillen. The text of the opinion makes clear that
the unanimous court in that case considered the statutory provision
at issue to be about the regulation of highway safety. 53 Although
the challenged provision itself was a regulation of the rules of evi-
dence to be applied in state court civil proceedings involving causes
of action .brought under state law, the regulation was limited to evi-
dence related to highway safety. As "channels of interstate com-
merce," highways are generally considered to be a regulatory area
of traditional and appropriate federal concern.5 4 It would there-
assment of another constitutes "discrimination" on the basis of sex within
the meaning of Title IX, and that - as applied to individual cases - the
standard for liability will enable the grant recipient to distinguish inappro-
priate childish behavior from actionable gender discrimination. The ma-
jority does not carry these burdens.
52. See id. at 658.
53. 537 U.S. at 147 (finding that the legislation at issue "can be viewed as legisla-
tion aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protection
for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce").
54. See, e.g., id; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114
(1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964).
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fore be consistent with my thesis for the States' Rights Five to have
concluded that the challenged provision did not exceed Congress's
spending power.
If my thesis is persuasive thus far, the question remains why the
Court did not simply decide Guillen on spending power grounds
rather than on the basis of a seemingly distorted Commerce Clause
analysis. One possibility is that the Court, including the States'
Rights Five, did not consider its commerce clause analysis in Guillen
to be any significant distortion of existing precedent. As the Guillen
Court observed, Lopez interpreted the Commerce Clause to permit
Congress "to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce ... even though the threat may come only from intra-
state activities. '55 And the Court explicitly interpreted the regula-
tion at issue in Guillen to be "aimed at... increasing protection for
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. ' 56 Thus, perhaps
Guillen was an easy case under the Commerce Clause.
The problem, however, is that neither Lopez nor the precedents
upon which it relies remotely establish that Congress is authorized
under the Commerce Clause to regulate just anything - including
state court judicial proceedings - so long as the regulation is
"aimed at" protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
Why did the States' Rights Five in Guillen apparently ignore this
distinction?
One plausible answer, I believe, has at its core an appreciation
that the recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the States'
Rights Five, like their spending power jurisprudence, is driven by a
(sometimes) unstated inquiry into whether the congressional stat-
ute would regulate an area "where States historically have been sov-
ereign,"5 7 or whether it instead involves a traditional and
appropriate federal function.
In support of this thesis one might recall that "subjects of tradi-
tional state regulation" was an unambiguous focus of the majority
in both Lopez and Aforison.58 In both cases, the majority was ex-
plicit that federal power should not extend to "areas such as crimi-
55. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 147.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 41.
58. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
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nal law enforcement or education where States historically have
been sovereign. ' 5 9 And in each case the Court held that Congress
had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause because it
deemed the regulatory area at issue to be one of traditional state
concern. The Gun Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez was quite
reasonably understood by the majority to involve both criminal law
enforcement and education, two of the areas in which it contended
that States historically had been sovereign. 60 And in Morrison,
which involved the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against
Women Act, the majority observed:
*. . The Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local .... The reg-
ulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods in-
volved in interstate commerce has always been the prov-
ince of the States .... Indeed, we can think of no better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States, than
the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims.
6 1
In Guillen,62 although the statutory provision regulates state
court rules of evidence, it does so only with regard to evidence re-
lated to highway safety. Thus, this provision, and the sense in which
the case is "about" an appropriate federal function (i.e., the regula-
tion of highway safety), seems markedly different from a hypotheti-
cal analogous statutory provision that might regulate state court
rules of evidence more broadly (e.g., in areas including, but not
limited to, highway safety). Once Guillen is understood in this way,
its Commerce Clause analysis seems quite consistent with the above
conception of both Lopez and Morrison in which the notion of "areas
in which States historically have been sovereign" serves as a pivotal,
if incompletely theorized, decisional principle.
Further, once Guillen is understood in this way, it seems clear
that there was no reason for the Court instead to decide the case on
59. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
60. See 514 U.S. at 564.
61. 529 U.S. at 617-18.
62. 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
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spending power grounds. The Commerce Clause analysis was
seemingly simple and straightforward. A Spending Clause analysis,
in contrast, would inevitably be lengthier and potentially more com-
plex, while posing awkward questions under Dole's "clear notice"
prong.
IV. CONCLUSION
If there is merit to this analysis, there is also a certain irony.
The inquiry into notions of "traditional" and "appropriate" areas of
state and federal regulatory concern, after all, is precisely the sort of
inquiry that the Court in Garcia declared a failure, 63 and that Chief
Justice Rehnquist in dissent promised would "in time command the
support of a majority of this Court."64 Future federalism decisions
will reveal the extent to which the very preliminary positive theory
that I have sketched here is accurate. No less importantly, future
decisions will also tell us whether the Court's apparent second at-
tempt at a National League of Cities65 type of federalism doctrine is in
any significant way an improvement on the first.
63. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
64. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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